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ABSTRACT
In this thesis, we present a computer agent for the game of no-limit Texas Hold'em Poker
for two players. Poker is a partially observable, stochastic, multi-agent, sequential game.
This combination of characteristics makes it a very challenging game to master for both
human and computer players. We explore this problem from an opponent modeling
perspective, using data mining to build a database of player styles that allows our agent to
quickly model the strategy of any new opponent. The opponent model is then used to
develop a robust counter strategy. A simpler version of this agent modified for a three
player game was able to win the 2011 MIT Poker Bot Competition.
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Title: Professor of Computer Science and Engineering
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Playing games is something that most people have done at some point in their lives.
Whether it is a board game, card game, or video game, we generally begin by learning
the rules of the game, and then we gradually improving in skill level as we gain more
experience. In competitive games where players are pitted against one another, the more
skillful players come on top more often than not.
Now what if we want to create computer programs that could play these games? They
will essentially need to make decisions given some information or knowledge just like
human players. While it is possible to create rule-based computer agents using expert
knowledge of humans, this approach is often cumbersome and inflexible, especially in
games such as poker where opponents' playing styles play a large role in the decision
making.
In this thesis, we will study opponent modeling in the game of two-player no-limit
Texas Hold'em poker and build a computer agent using an opponent modeling approach.
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1.1 Motivation
1.1.1 Why Games?
Artificial Intelligence research involving classic games has been around since as early as
the advent of computers. Chess, Checkers, and Othello are some of the earliest games to
be studied. As of today, the best chess programs, having estimated elo ratings of over
3200, far surpass the current human Chess world champion Magnus Carlsen's 2837
rating[2][14]. Checkers has been solved for perfect play in 2007[10]. Starting from
around the past decade, poker has been receiving increasing attention by researchers as
the game experienced a dramatic boom in popularity.
Games are usually a form of entertainment, but why should anyone devote so much
time toward developing AIs for them? Well, games are all about making decisions -
potentially under time constraints - using some set of knowledge or information. It's just
like what people, companies, and governments do every day in the real world, from
trading stocks to setting prices of new products. When different choices are available
there are of course different outcomes, some better than others. Therefore, we want to
study decision making in classic games to be able to apply similar techniques to problems
in the real world.
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1.1.2 Why Poker?
Poker, a game that is often said to be easy to learn but hard to master, has a number of
defining characteristics that makes it different from some of the previously mentioned
games:
1. Poker is an imperfect information game, meaning players cannot observe the entire
state of the game. Each player can see the cards they are holding, but not the ones
in the opponent's hand.
2. Poker is stochastic, meaning the same action performed in one game state can
probabilistically transition into a number of different game states. Unlike in chess
where each move can only have a single fixed outcome, in poker, future
community cards are random.
3. Poker has varying levels of success in each game. In chess, it does not matter if
you reach checkmate with all your pieces remaining or only one. In poker, you
want to win as much chips from the opponent as possible.
These properties of poker are also shared by most real world problems. Nobody can
possess every bit of information available, nor can anyone predict the future with one
hundred percent certainty. Outcomes are rarely confined to perfect success or failure, but
rather somewhere in between. While the addition of these properties is a better reflection
of reality, it also makes creating a computer poker agent a challenging and interesting
problem for research. A number of groups in the research community have been actively
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tackling this problem, and there are also computer poker competitions such as the one
held annually at the annual AAAI conference to showcase their efforts.
1.2 Thesis Contribution and Focus
Agent
Decision making
Belief
Opponent Model H
Environment
Action
Observation
Dealer
Opponent
Figure 1.1 shows the high-level model of the computer agent and how it interacts with the
environment.
This thesis focuses on creating a computer agent for poker from an opponent modeling
perspective. The high level picture of our agent is described in Figure 1.1. The agent has
an opponent model that is updated when there is an observation of opponent action. The
belief, which is a probability distribution over state spaces, is updated with the help of the
opponent model after any observation from the environment. Both the opponent model
and belief contribute to the agent's decision making component which uses a simulation
approach to determine an action to send back to the environment.
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The opponent modeling and decision making algorithms are formulated in
collaboration with Frans Oliehoek and Chris Amato. The author implemented the
computer agent and poker engine on which to test the agent and also performed the
experiments shown near the end of this thesis.
1.3 Thesis Organization
Chapter 2 gives an overview of poker and presents some of the existing computer poker
agents. Chapter 3 describes the method we use to model the opponent's strategy,
including game state abstractions and inference through data mining. Chapter 4 discusses
the decision making part of the agent and how we make use of the opponent model and
simulation techniques to facilitate this process. Chapter 5 shows the performance of the
agent when running against a number of benchmark opponents as well as comparisons of
algorithms used in different versions of the agent.
13
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Rules of No-Limit Texas Hold'em
There are many variations of poker and different formats of competition, such as
tournaments or cash games. The most popular variation is Texas Hold'em, and in this
thesis we will focus on two-player No-Limit Texas Hold'em.
Each player starts with a stack of chips that they can use to make bets. The goal is to
win chips from the opponent through a number of short games. The game begins when
both players place forced bets called blinds. One player called the dealer will be the small
blind, and the other player will be the big blind which is generally double the amount of
the small blind.
Next, two cards called hole cards, seen only by the player holding them, will be dealt
from a standard 52-card deck to each player, followed by a round of betting where
players take turns making actions. The first round of betting starts with the dealer. During
each player's turn, he has the three types of actions to choose from.
If a playerfolds, he forfeits the hand and all chips that were bet in this game goes to
the other player immediately.
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If a player checks or calls, he will match the amount the opponent has bet. If the
opponent bet nothing, the action is a check, otherwise it is a call. If the caller has fewer
chips than the amount raised, then he will simply bet all he has and the unmatched chips
will be returned to the raiser.
If a player bets or raises, he increases the amount to be wagered, forcing the opponent
to call or raise again if he does not want to give up the hand. The amount that can be
raised in a limit game is always a single fixed amount of either one or two big blinds, and
in a no-limit game is any amount between the big blind and one's entire chip stack. If the
opponent has made a bet or raise in the current round, the minimum raise amount is then
at least the amount the opponent has raised by. For example, if player A bets 20 chips and
player B raises to 70 chips, then if player A wants to raise again, the amount must be at
least 120 chips.
A round of betting ends when both players have made at least one action and the last
action is a check or call. Essentially the players can raise back and forth as many times as
they like until one player has bet his entire chip stack or calls. However, in reality raises
rarely occur more than 3 or 4 times in one round.
After the first round of betting, 3 community cards called the flop that both players
share are dealt from the same deck. This is followed by another round of betting, this
time, starting with the player who is not the dealer. Then 1 community card called the
turn is dealt with another round of betting, and finally the last community card called the
river is dealt with the last round of betting.
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If neither player has folded after the last round of betting, then they will go to the
showdown where players reveal their hole cards and each will look for the best 5 card
combination they can make using any combination of their 2 hole cards and the 5
community cards. The player with the stronger 5 card combination wins all of the chips
that were wagered in this game, called the pot. If the card strengths are the same, then
they share the pot.
Strengths of 5 card combinations are listed in Table 1.1 below.
Name Description Example
Straight flush 5 consecutive ranked cards of the same suit Q J 10 9 8 all clubs
4-of-a-kind 4 cards of the same rank A A A A 9
Full house 3-of-a-kind and 1 pair J J J 8 8
Flush 5 cards of the same suit K J 10 7 3 all clubs
Straight 5 consecutive ranked cards 9 8 7 6 5
3-of-a-kind 3 cards of the same rank 8 8 8 Q 2
2 pairs 2 pairs 1010665
Pair 2 cards of the same rank AAK87
High-card None of above Q J 9 6 4
Table 1.1 shows types of 5-card hands for Texas Hold'em poker from strongest to weakest.
Within each category, the ranks of the cards will further decide their strengths. For example
KKK32 is stronger than JJJ94, and 88Q43 is stronger than 88J96. Ties are therefore fairly
uncommon.
2.2 Game Theoretic Overview
Two-player poker can be modeled as a zero-sum game. The representation, or extensive
form, of the game is a tree, where nodes are game states and directed edges are transitions.
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Figure 2.1 shows a partial tree of the game that shows some of the important features.
There are two types of nodes in the tree, decision nodes that transitions based on action
from players and dealer nodes that make stochastic transitions when cards are dealt.
D
2c2dj2h2s c2dj23c AcAdjAhAs
Pi Pi .......... Pi
Fold Call Raise min Raise max
P2 P2 .......... P
R = (+0.5, -0.5)
Check Raise min Raise max
D Pi Pi
Deal Fold Call Raise X
Flop
P2 ...... P2 P2 P2 P2
R = (+1, -1)
Show down
R=(+r,-r)
Figure 2.1 shows a partial tree representing a two-player game of poker. Many of the nodes and
transitions are omitted. The square nodes are the dealer nodes, and circle nodes are decision
nodes for the players. The game begins with the root dealer node transitioning to player 1 through
one of around 2 million hole card combinations. The players then take turns making actions.
When a fold or show down occurs, the game ends and positive and negative rewards are given out.
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Because poker is an imperfect information game, players do not get to see the entire
game state whenever making an action. The part of the game state that the player can
observe is called the information set, which includes his own hole cards, community
cards, and previous actions - in other words, everything except the opponent's hole cards.
2.2.1 Strategy
We define a strategy as a mapping from any information set to a probability distribution
over legal actions. We use a probability distribution over actions because in imperfect
information games, these mixed strategies are more robust than pure strategies that maps
information sets to fixed single actions. A simple example to illustrate this claim with the
game of Rock, Paper, Scissors is that the strategy of always choosing Rock is much
easier to recognize and exploit than a strategy that chooses the three actions uniformly at
random. Now tying strategies back to our extensive form game, notice that to a player,
many of the nodes in the tree have the same information set due to the hidden opponent
hole cards. The number of information sets is actually much lower than the number of
game states, and from a player's perspective, he could very well reduce the game tree by
ignoring opponent's hole cards. The question now is what would be the best strategy for
poker? There are two ways to look at this problem.
19
2.2.2 Nash-Equilibrium
First we will define the Nash-Equilibrium for a two-player zero-sum game.
Definition 2.1 Let -i be the strategy of player i. Let Tji be the strategy of player i's
opponent. Also let the expected return of strategy ni be E(i, m-.). Then 7T* = (rI, 7T2 ) is
a Nash-Equilibrium if and only if:
Vi' , E(t1 i,m.i) > E(un', Tg) for i = 1,2
In other words, if each player is using a strategy such that changing it will not provide
more expected return against the opponent's current strategy, then it is a Nash-
Equilibrium. An example of the Nash-Equilibrium for Rock, Paper, Scissors would be
both players choosing the three actions uniformly at random.
For a zero-sum game like poker, at Nash-Equilibrium the two players can expect to tie
in the long run. In reality, however, human players are not able to play so accurately and
computer players can only play at an estimated equilibrium at best because finding an
exact equilibrium for a problem of this enormous size is practically impossible.
2.2.3 Best Response
Suppose instead that we are playing against a terrible player who is using a static strategy,
using the equilibrium strategy will certainly give us a positive expected return, but it's
possible to do much better. We will define the best response strategy as follows.
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Definition 2.2 Let it 2 be the strategy of player 2, and let the expected return of strategy
ii be E(Tri, Tri). Then 4r is the best response to 2 if and only if:
V-n' , E(T', 72 ) > E(Ti, T2O
The best response is usually a pure strategy, meaning it itself is very exploitable. It is
the best strategy to use against an opponent whose strategy is static and known perfectly,
but that is also not a very realistic assumption.
2.3 Related Work
Currently the most popular approach to creating computer poker agents has been finding
near-equilibrium strategies. As mentioned before, since it is impossible to obtain exact
Nash-Equilibrium, a number of techniques are used to calculate near-equilibrium
strategies. Most competitive agents do so by using an abstraction algorithm to first reduce
the number of game states and then using custom algorithms to solve the abstracted game
for equilibrium [9]. This technique is used, in conjunction with a lossless information
abstraction algorithm GameShrink, to solve a simpler version of the game called Rhode
Island Hold'em Poker for the exact equilibrium [3]. However, for the much larger Texas
Hold'em Poker, only lossy information abstractions can bring the game down to a
manageable size.
A significant amount of work in poker Al has been done at the University of Alberta's
Computer Poker Research Group (CPRG) led by Michael Bowling. They have developed
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a number of poker agents over time for both Limit and No-Limit Texas Hold'em. Their
current state of the art poker agents play a near-equilibrium strategy computed using an
iterative algorithm called Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR). The idea behind
CFR is essentially letting agents play against each other, adjusting their strategies after
each hand to minimize how much more they would have earned by taking the best
possible action, or regret [15].
This near-equilibrium approach appears to be one of the most promising techniques so
far. In 2007, the poker agent Polaris played against world-class poker professionals in
two-player Limit Texas Hold'em and won in a number of duplicate matches in the First
Man-Machine Poker Championship [6]. Since then, the strength of Limit Hold'em agents
has steadily increased and has reached or surpassed the human world champion level of
play. However, No-Limit agents have not yet achieved that level due to the significant
increase in the number of game states from having a much larger range of legal actions at
each decision node.
Using a near-equilibrium strategy ensures that the agent cannot be exploited, but at the
same time, it also limits itself from being able to fully exploit weaker opponents. In an
environment consisting of mostly very strong players, playing a near-equilibrium strategy
is a good idea as strong opponents rarely open themselves up to be exploited. However,
not everyone is a strong player, and against weak opponents, there is no reason not to
exploit them to a greater degree. After all, the objective of the game is not simply to win
but to win as much as possible. Of course, the idea of exploitive counter-strategies in
poker is not new. Vexbot, an agent developed in 2003 at CPRG, did just that. It kept a
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model that learns the opponent's frequency of actions at every decision point and
attempts to exploit the opponent's strategy. While Vexbot would lose to some of the best
equilibrium agents today, it could potentially be a better choice against weaker opponents
[11].
The third approach is to use robust counterstrategies, where the agent would employ
an exploitive strategy that limits its own exploitability. CPRG introduced the Restricted
Nash Response algorithm for this approach. The algorithm computes a strategy that
exploits the opponent as much as possible while having a lower bound on how much it
would lose in the worst case scenario when the model of the opponent is inaccurate [1].
This approach is ideal for maximizing profits against unknown opponents. Our agent
described in this thesis belongs to this third category. However instead of the technique
above, we will explore the effectiveness of using a simulation-based approach to compute
robust counterstrategies.
23
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Chapter 3
Opponent Modeling
As stated earlier, we want to build a computer agent that implements a robust
counterstrategy against opponents. However before a counterstrategy can be built, we
must first know the strategy of the opponent. We know that a strategy is a mapping from
information sets to a probability distribution over legal actions, but let us define it more
precisely.
Definition 3.1 Let I be the set of all information sets in a poker game. Let A be the set of
all legal actions. Then a strategy is a function
r: I x A -> [0, 1]
Such that
Vi E I, Y (i, a) = 1
aEA
Now that we know how to describe a strategy, how do does the agent actually model
the strategy of the opponent? No opponent will simply hand out his strategy on a piece of
paper, so it must be learned through observations while playing. However, due to the
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large number of game states and limited number of observations from the opponent,
estimating the strategy proves to be rather challenging. We will describe the abstraction
algorithm used to reduce the number of game states and data mining technique used to
make inferences about little observed information sets in the opponent's strategy.
3.1 Abstractions
The number of information sets in Texas Hold'em is on the order of 1018 in limit
Hold'em, and in no-limit the existence of additional action choices increases it to over
1050 in a game with starting stacks of 100 big blinds, making it impossible to store in
memory without any compression.
To deal with this, abstractions must be used to greatly reduce the size without losing
too much information. Abstractions essentially group together closely related information
sets into a single one [12]. Since the information set in poker is composed of both cards
and action sequences, we will focus on each one individually.
3.1.1 Hand Strength
A player can see at most 7 cards - 2 in his hand and 5 on the table. There are on the order
of 10 9 such combinations. To a player, the most important information about the cards is
the relative strength of his hole cards compared to all other possible hole cards, with
respect to the community cards. Instead of keeping track of the individual cards, we can
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instead convert every combination of cards to some value between 0.0 and 1.0 to indicate
the hand strength.
There are a number of methods to estimate the strength of a hand. The values
computed by different methods are not quite the same, so we will consider some of the
most common ones.
The most nalve hand strength is sometimes called the immediate hand rank (IHR).
Calculating IHR requires relatively little computation. It first enumerates all of the
possible hole cards that the opponent could hold and then checks to see what percentage
of those hands could be beaten if neither player's hand improved. The problem with this
method is that it ignores the chance that the hand improves from future community cards,
which may happen quite often in poker [7].
A more accurate estimator of hand strength is the 7-card hand rank (7cHR). This is
essentially the probability that the hand wins at the showdown against a uniform
distribution of opponent hole cards. It can be computed by enumerating (or sampling for
better performance) all opponent hole cards and future community cards and outputting
the percentage our hand wins [7]. There are other estimators that use slightly different
algorithms or uses a combination of the above two methods. For the purpose of our poker
agent, we will use 7cHR and bucket the values between 0.0 and 1.0 into 20 equal sized
buckets. The bucketing is necessary because otherwise the hand strength could take on
millions of different floating point values.
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3.1.2 Action Sequences
To shrink the number of action sequences, we first consider the actions a player can make
at each decision node. He can fold, check/call, or raise any amount between the minimum
and his entire chip stack. In reality, rarely do players raise more than twice the value of
the pot, so we chose to use a small number of buckets for different raise amounts. These
raise amounts are usually some fraction of the pot. For example in our implementation
we used two buckets, one for raises less than or equal to the pot and one for raises over
the pot.
Further abstractions are made by reducing the space of action sequences through
bucketing. Instead of keeping track of the action sequence in all rounds of betting, we
compress the information from the previous rounds by only tracking the number of raises
in the previous betting round and who the last aggressor was. The action sequence of the
current betting round is for the most part unchanged. However if the number of actions
exceed 4, only the last 4 actions in the sequence will be tracked. The actual bucketing
algorithm is described below.
1. Each bucket is represented by a string of digits.
2. The first digit represents the round of betting the game is currently in. 0 represents
preflop; 1 for flop, 2 for turn, and 3 for river.
3. The second digit represents the number of raises that occurred in the previous
betting round if it exists. This digit can be as low as 0 and is capped at 4.
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4. The third digit represents the last aggressor, or last person to have raised, in the
previous round. 0 indicates that the opponent being modeled is the last aggressor,
and 1 indicates that it is the agent.
5. The remaining digits represent the betting sequence in the current betting round. 1
represents a check or call, 2 represents a below or equal to pot raise, and 3
represents an above pot raise. (Fold is not needed because there will never be
action after it) The length of this sequence is capped at 4. If more than 4 actions
are taken in the current round, only the last 4 will be used.
Table 3.1 gives some examples of how full action sequences are mapped to buckets.
Complete action sequence Bucket
(Beginning of game) 000
Call, Low Raise 00012
High Raise, Low Raise, Call, Flop, Check 1210
Call, Check, Flop, Check, Check, Turn, Check, High Raise, Low Raise 200132
Low Raise, Low Raise, Low Raise, High Raise, Low Raise, Low Raise 0002322
Table 3.1 examples of action sequences mapping to buckets. The opponent is the first to act in all
of the examples.
Using the abstractions mentioned above, the number of information sets can be
reduced to 105_106, a large but much more manageable size. The set of bucketed
information sets I is now equivalent to S x H, where S is the set of bucketed action
sequences and H is the set of bucketed hand strengths.
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3.2 Generalizing across Information Sets
While there is no longer a memory constraint problem in representing the opponent
strategy, it would still take an impractically large number of games to obtain enough
observations in each information set to accurately estimate the mixed strategy. Even after
using abstractions to shrink the number of information sets, it is still far greater than the
number of observations of opponent actions in normal game play. Professional human
player can get a good sense of their opponent after just a few hundred games, so we know
that playing millions of hands should not be necessary.
To deal with this issue, we must generalize about values in information sets that have
few or no observations, using the assumption that the values in different information sets
are not independent to each other. The space over all possible strategies is in no way
uniform. With a large dataset of heads-up hand histories between different players, we
can see examples of the type of strategies real players use. Suppose our abstraction of the
opponent's strategy is a JIxIAI matrix ir, where I is the set of bucketed information sets
and A is the number of bucketed actions (4 in this case), then 7ria is the frequency the
opponent chooses action a in information set i. We can estimate these frequencies for
each player in the dataset. The goal, however, is to be able to estimate this matrix for a
new opponent that the agent is facing even with a low number of observed actions.
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3.2.1 Data Mining
We obtained a dataset of 7 million heads-up games between thousands of players on a
popular online poker casino called PokerStars. Unfortunately one immediate problem that
came up during data mining is that so few of the games revealed the players' hole cards,
preventing us from finding out the hand strength of the players. This is due to the nature
of the game itself, because players often fold before reaching the showdown if they
believe their hand is beaten, and hole cards are not shown if a showdown is not reached.
To deal with this issue, we decided to first ignore hand strengths for the moment and only
produce a mapping from action sequence to probability distribution over actions using the
dataset. Then a heuristic is used to reconstruct a full scale strategy matrix 7r that includes
the hand strength.
3.2.2 Strategy Reconstruction
Our goal is to construct a function f1 that take as input any probability distribution over
actions observed without regard to hand strength, d E D, where D is the set of all such
distributions, and output functions f2: H -+ D which maps hand strengths h E H to
different distributions. d is a vector <f, c, rl, r2>, where f is the probability of folding, c
is the probability of calling, rl the probability of raising below or equal to pot, and r2 the
probability of raising above pot. For simplicity in notations later, we will say that the 4
actions have risks of 0, 1, 2, and 3 associated with them respectively.
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In order to construct function f 1, we need to make a number of assumptions based on
rational play.
1. The higher the risk associated with the action the opponent takes, the stronger his
hand strength is likely to be.
2. The probability of taking an action that has at least some risk value v is modeled
by a logistic curve with respect to hand strength as shown by an example in
Figure 3.1.
d =<0.3, 0.30.2,0.2>
0.9-
0.8-
o 0.7-
A
0.6-
0.5
OA --
0
0.3-
0.2-
0.1
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Hand Strength
Figure 3.1 shows an example of the probability of not folding with respect to hand strength when
d = <0.3, 0.3, 0.2, 0.2>.
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The first assumption is rather obvious. The stronger the hand is, the more likely the
player will win at show down. Therefore, it is beneficial to bet more when the chance of
winning is higher. For the second assumption, a number of other curves such as a step
function or linear function could have been chosen. If we used a step function, the
opponent model would end up being a pure strategy which is not realistic. A linear
function could be reasonable, but we ultimately chose the logistic function in order to
have a tipping point at which the probability of taking a certain amount of risk drops off
quickly. Like the graph in Figure 3.1, the probability of taking risk of at least 2 and the
probability of taking risk of 3 have similar shapes. Each of the curves is parameterized by
c + ri + r2, ri + r2, or r2, respectively. These values shift the curves either to the left or
right. Figure 3.2 and 3.3 shows graphs of hand strength to action probabilities that were
computed with our algorithm with distributions d =< 0.15, 0.3,0.4,0.15 > and d =<
0.3, 0.3, 0.4, 0.0 >.
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d = <0.15,0.3,0.4,0.15>
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Figure 3.2 shows graphs of action distributions vs. hand strength. Each curve on the graph
represents probability of risk > c, for c = 0, 1, 2, 3. Between the curves are the probabilities of
different actions. Graph b) has no area showing raise above pot because r2 = 0.
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Figure 3.3 shows action probabilities vs. hand strength individually. The value of the curves in
the graphs here are essentially the difference between the curves in Figure 3.2.
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Using this method, the full strategy can be reconstructed for the players in the dataset.
However, understandably this reconstructed strategy is not as accurate as if we had built
it with the knowledge of all the hole cards, and we hope to change this once more data is
obtained in the future.
3.2.3 Estimating Strategy of New Opponents
Now that we have a dataset of full strategies for thousands of real players, we can use it
to help estimate the strategy of a new opponent. The distribution of strategies that players
take on is most likely a smooth function, meaning if frequencies in a subset of the
strategy matrix between two players are very similar, then it is more likely for the rest of
the strategy matrix to have similar frequencies between them as well. Using this idea, we
can estimate the frequency of actions in information sets with few or no observations for
a new opponent by taking a weighted average over strategies in the dataset that are
similar to the new opponent's in the observed information sets.
To calculate the weight, we came up with a distance metric between observations from
the new opponent to strategies in the dataset. To calculate this distance, first a raw
opponent strategy is computed using frequency of observations in each information set. If
the information set has no observation, the action distribution defaults to uniform. The
action distribution each information set maps to is treated as a vector, and we find the
Euclidian distance between distributions in each information set between the raw
opponent strategy and the player's strategy from the dataset. The distance between the
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two strategies is the average of these Euclidian distances weighted by the number of
observations in each information set.
The weight of each strategy in the dataset then became the inverse square distance
between itself and the new opponent. The strategy of the new opponent is then shifted
toward the weighted average of the dataset. The amount of shift depends on the number
of observations in each information set; the more observation, the less the shift. For
example the frequency of actions in information sets with zero observations is completely
replaced by the weighted average, and ones with over 100 observations are not shifted at
all.
37
38
Chapter 4
Decision Making
Using the opponent model to compute an appropriate action is the second component of
the poker agent. First, the poker agent will track the uncertainty in the opponent's hole
cards with Bayesian inference. Then, it will estimate an expected return for each
available action choice. Finally, it will calculate a mixed strategy based on the expected
returns.
4.1 Opponent Hole Card Distribution
To clearly define the uncertainty in the opponent's hole cards, the agent will store a
probability distribution over every possible hole card combination. This distribution is
essentially the belief state, and it is initialized to uniform at the beginning of each hand.
For each action that the opponent makes, we will update the distribution as shown in
Figure 4.1.
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Let z be the action that has just been taken by the opponent.
Let C represent the set of all possible hole cards.
Let 7r(s, c, z) be the probability given in the opponent model that at action sequence s with
opponent holding hole cards c that he would have taken action z.
P(c), the probability that opponent is holding c, will be updated with the following equation:
VC P'(c) = P(c) * 7r(s, c, z)
N
Where N is a normalization factor defined as:
N = P(c) * r(s, c, z)
CEC
Figure 4.1 shows how the agent updates the probability distribution of opponent's hole cards.
4.2 Estimating Expected Return
To estimate the expected return of different actions, we will use a method similar to
David Silver's Monte-Carlo planning for large POMDPs [13]. For each available action
an expectation will be calculated by averaging over a number of simulations that plays
out the rest of the hand. In each simulation the opponent will be assigned a pair of hole
cards based on the distribution mentioned in the previous section. Future community
cards will be generated uniformly at random, and opponent's actions will be generated
based on the opponent model. The main difference between the method we implemented
and the original by David Silver is that instead of also computing the expectations of
different actions in child nodes, we only care about the actions from the current decision
node. This means a lower number of simulations will need to be run to arrive at a
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reasonably accurate expectation. The question now is what rollout policy to use when
picking subsequent actions for the agent itself in the simulation.
4.2.1 Uniformly Random Action Selection
A naive method of similarly calculating the expectation for actions in later nodes and
picking the best one would not be possible because the number of nodes in the tree, and
therefore computational cost, is too high. A feasible option would be to randomly select
later actions for the agent even though this does not accurately reflect how the agent
really will play in the future.
4.2.2 Self-Model Action Selection
An alternative method is to let the agent keep a strategy model of itself exactly the same
way it keeps track of the opponent model. It can then use the self-model to generate
actions during simulation at the same speed as generating opponent actions. We
compared the two methods against bench mark computer agents in Section 5.2.
The agent always chooses 1 of 4 possible actions. It can fold, check/call, raise 0.7
times the pot, or raise 1.5 times the pot. Fold always has an expected return of exactly 0,
so no simulation is necessary. The other three actions go through 100 simulations each.
At the end of each simulation the reward is calculated by taking the pot won (if any) and
subtracting the total amount of chips committed since the beginning of simulation. Any
chips that were committed in the action sequence before simulation started are considered
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sunk cost and are not subtracted from the reward. The expected reward of the action will
simply be the average over the rewards from each simulation.
4.3 Calculating Strategy using Expected Returns
Once simulations are over, we get a 4-tuple of expected returns for the 4 action. If the
agent simply chose the action with the highest return, it would be playing the best-
response pure strategy which also makes itself exploitable. Since we want a robust
counterstrategy, the agent needs to come up with a mixed strategy based on the returns.
We came up with the following rules to calculating a mixed strategy.
1. Any action that has negative expected returns will have zero probability.
2. The ratio of at which actions with positive expected returns will be chosen is
equal to the ratio of their returns.
3. If no action has positive expected return, then the agent will always fold.
With these rules, the best action will always have the highest probability of being
chosen. However it still allows the agent to other actions at times to be less predictable.
Rule number 2 uses that particular ratio because it is somewhat reasonable, but different
ratios may be tested in the future. One may notice that there are still instances where the
agent will still play a single action 100% of the times. This fact does not necessarily
make the agent more exploitable because there are legitimate times when there should
only be one choice. For example, if the opponent bets all his chips while the agent is
holding cards that are impossible to win, then the only good option is to fold.
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Chapter 5
Results
5.1 Duplicate Poker
Poker is a game of high variance. In order to conclude with statistical significance that
one poker player is better than another, we would normally need to see a very large
number of hands played. To compare computer poker agents, we could greatly reduce the
variance by playing duplicate poker.
In duplicate poker, two players will simultaneously play against each other at two
different tables. The exact same hole cards and community cards will be dealt at both
table, but the position of the players will be reversed on one of the tables. In practice of
course, the two matches can occur one after the other as long as memories of the previous
match are erased when the duplicate match starts.
Duplicate poker is widely used in computer poker research, because it reduces the
number of hands needed, and therefore time cost, when evaluating poker agents.
43
5.2 Experiments
The two agents whose performance we are interested in are:
1. MC-Random: Agent picks actions for itself uniformly at random during simulation.
2. MC-Self-Model: Agent keeps track of a strategy model of itself and uses it to
generate actions during simulation.
To test the computer agent, we created a number of benchmark agents to play against.
The benchmark agents are the following:
1. No-Model: Agent uses a default model of the opponent (model when there are no
observations) and never updates it.
2. RaiseBot: Agent will always raise 0.7 times the pot.
3. CallBot: Agent will always call, or check when appropriate.
For the experiment, we ran 10000 hands of duplicate poker between every pair of the
above agents. Each agent starts with 100 big blinds at the beginning of each hand. The
results are in Table 5.1.
MC-Random MC-Self-Model No-Model RaiseBot CallBot
MC-Random +3.5942 +4.7398 +14.1988 +16.8359
MC-Self-Model -3.5942 +2.0839 +5.9154 +15.2184
No-Model -4.7398 -2.0839 -10.2261 +5.3785
RaiseBot -14.1988 -5.9154 +10.2261 0.0
CallBot -16.8359 -15.2184 -5.3785 0.0
Table 5.1 shows the results from matches played between pairs of computer agents. Values in the
table are average number of big blinds won per hand by agents to the left of the row.
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Contrary to our expectations, MC-Random performed better than MC-Self-Model. In
fact, it won more chips in each of the benchmark matches and came out positive in the
match between the two. Figure 5.1 shows the amount MC-Random won from MC-Self-
Model over the course of the 10000 hands.
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Figure 5.1 graphs the net profit of MC-Random as the match against MC-Self-Model progressed.
In 10000 hands of duplicate poker against MC-Self-Model, MC-Random made a total
profit of 35942 big blinds with a standard deviation of about 4813, meaning we can
conclude without a doubt that MC-Random is indeed superior. However, what is the
reasoning behind this result? Why would randomly picking actions during simulation
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have significant advantage over the seemingly more rational approach using a self-model?
One possible answer is that because both agents are adapting to each other's strategies,
the self-model may not be changing fast enough to reflect the agent's true current strategy.
Using the outdated self-model during simulation somehow ended up biasing against itself,
giving the agent with the simpler approach an advantage.
There are several other results in Table 5.1 that are worth mentioning. Both agents
MC-Random and MC-Self-Model performed better than No-Model against the other
benchmarks, meaning that the opponent modeling proves to be useful in this case. The
agent No-Model did very poorly against the bot that always raised. Other than not
updating the opponent model, the rest of No-Model is exactly the same as MC-Random.
The reason it lost against RaiseBot is that it folded way too often thinking that RaiseBot
has very strong hands. Because it never keeps track of how often the opponent is raising,
it updates its belief state as if playing against a normal opponent, placing too much
weight on strong opponent hole cards.
Finally, we see that RaiseBot did better than CallBot in all of their respective matches.
While both agents are just about as simple as possible, this supports the notion among
poker players that being aggressive is better than being passive.
5.3 MIT Poker Competition
The second annual MIT Poker Competition was held in January of 2012. About 27 teams
submitted computer agents to play in matches of three-player poker. Our agent, Chezebot,
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which is based on most of the concepts described in this thesis but with a number of
modifications to fit the three-player format, placed first in the competition. The only
major conceptual difference was in the decision making component. Due to time
constraints that did not make simulations possible, the agent evaluated its hand strength
against the belief state of the opponent's hole cards and used a heuristic to convert the
hand strength into a mixed strategy.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
6.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, we have presented an opponent modeling approach to creating a computer
poker agent. First we discussed the challenges in modeling a strategy for the game of
poker and presented corresponding solutions. We also described the method used to
estimate the strategy of new opponents with the help of data mining.
Next we showed how the computer agent makes use of the opponent model to arrive at
a robust counterstrategy against that opponent. In the process, we described the belief
state update in the agent as response to observations, and we discussed a number of
simulation techniques used to estimate expected return of different actions.
Finally, experimental results are presented in which duplicate poker matches are used
to evaluate the performance of different versions of the agent against benchmarks.
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6.2 Future Work
Our agent now plays only at a low to medium amateur level. A number of future changes
could be made to improve its performance.
6.2.1 Improving data mining
Due to the lack of hole card information in our dataset, currently a heuristic is needed to
convert the mapping from action sequence to action distribution into a full scale strategy.
This greatly decreases the accuracy of the list of strategies from players in the dataset. If
we are able to use a large dataset of hand histories that includes hole cards, then it would
remove the need for a heuristic and allow us to calculate a much better opponent model
from the dataset.
6.2.2 Choosing Action Based on Opponent's Exploitability
Against an opponent that plays a static strategy, using the best-response would be the
optimal strategy. However, if the opponent is a good player who also adapts quickly, then
it would be wiser to play closer to a Nash-Equilibrium. Therefore, we can try to
approximate how well the opponent adapts to determine what strategy our agent will use,
moving toward equilibrium when results seem unfavorable [4].
Between each hand (or a number of hands), the agent can measure how well its own
strategy is exploiting the opponent by measuring the change in profit per hand.
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Figure 6.1 illustrates a visual representation of the balanced strategy and shows how it is
calculated.
Exploitability should be directly proportional to profit per hand. If profit rate is high or
increasing, then it would show that the opponent is not adapting quickly enough, and the
agent can play slightly closer to the best response. If the profit rate is low or decreasing,
then the agent will play a more mixed strategy. An exploit factor between 0 and 1 is
stored to indicate the balance between equilibrium and best response as shown in Figure
6.1. This factor increases or decreases based on the change in exploitability. This idea is
not new as it was also mentioned in (Bowling, M., et al. 2007) as a possible
implementation of a robust counter-strategy, but it may still be an improvement from
using the same counter-strategy without considering profitability [1].
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e = Exploitability Factor
A = Equilibrium
B = Best Response
C = (1- e) * A + e * B
Strategy Space
A
C
B
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